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## **National Intelligence Daily**

Saturday 22 May 1982

**Top Secret** 

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


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6	USSR-Italy:	Communist	Party Rel	ations		• • •	5

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) USSR-ITALY: Communist Party R	Relations
The Soviets want to improve the Communist Party, which were badly st the issue of Poland.	neir relations with the Italian trained earlier this year over
A senior Soviet party off in an article in a left-leanin Moscow still considers the Ita party and does not want to pur	ng Italian newspaper that alian party a major fraternal
Comment: Both the Soviet have indicated over the past for to avoid an open break. Simil followed earlier disputes over conflict, Afghanistan and other	Lar periods of rapprochement the Vietnamese-Kampuchean
have indicated over the past for the avoid an open break. Simily followed earlier disputes over conflict, Afghanistan and other moscow's concern for idea be outweighed by tactical considering to spur the peace movem appears to dictate cooperation and other independent groups as	Tew months that they want Lar periods of rapprochement of the Vietnamese-Kampuchean er issues.  cological orthodoxy may now siderations. The Soviets' ment in Western Europe of with the Italian party
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
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